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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Amy and Navy-Selective Service-When Is Induction Complete?
Habeas Corpus. Petitioner contended that he was unlawfully de-
prived of his liberty and held for army service. He stated that he was a
conscientious objector and urged that claim before his local draft board.
Being overruled, he appealed to the state board; and again being denied,
he presented himself at the induction center to which he had been di-
rected. There he was given a physical examination and notified of his
acceptance for service in the army and was commanded to stand and
take the oath of induction. He refused, and was ordered to the guard
house, and this proceeding followed.
After an interesting discussion of the petitioner's social philosophy
and background, the court agreed with the draft board that he was not
a conscientious objector but a combination of Socrates' and Mohandas
- Like Socrates, he "thought the law was unjust, but . . . didn't feel the call to
evade it."
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Gandhi, 2 and "an over-educated, egotistical, scholastic slacker." He
contended that he was not finally inducted and subject to military author-
ity till he took the oath of induction. However, it was held that he
became a soldier subject to military jurisdiction when he was accepted
for service by the government, irrespective of his personal desires or
mental attitude. Habeas corpus denied.3
At another point in the opinion, the court stated that notice of ac-
ceptance operated as induction. Thus it is not clear whether actual
notice is necessary, but, from its discussion taken as a whole, it would
seem that this court would not require notice. With this, the officials of
the Army and the Selective Service appear to be in full accord. Maj.
Charles R. Jonas, North Carolina State Director of Selective Service,
has said that after the Selective Service delivers the draftee to the induc-
tion station "The question of induction ... is one for the army to de-
termine .... Billings [petitioner] probably could have been returned to
his local board by the recruiting and induction officer, and he could have
been prosecuted [by the civil authorities] for refusal to submit himself
for induction [which is just what the petitioner contended for]. The
recruiting and induction officer decided to proceed otherwise, and ap-
parently his procedure has met with the approval of the court."4
If this be the law, it is different from the law under the Selective
Draft Act of 19175 which required notice of physical qualification for
service."* One case under that act, however, tends to substantiate the
principal case in holding that no oath was necessary to induction ;7 but
this was based on an express statutory provision that all enlistees and
draftees were subject to military law from the date that their notices of
call required them to report,8 and the notices themselves contained such
a statement. This applied whether or not the notice was ever actually
received.9 If the address to which the notice was mailed was correct,10
then the mailing constituted complete notice."'
2Like Gandhi, he said if the Germans and Japanese occupied our country, he
would not resist, but he would not cooperate with the invaders.
Ex parte Billings, 46 F. Supp. 663 (D. C. Kan. 1942).
'Letter to the author (January 15, 1943).
'40 STAT. 76 (1917), as amended, 40 STAT. 534 (1918), 40 STAT. 885 (1918),
40 STAT. 995 (1918), 50 U. S. C. A. p. 165 (1927).
O. Ver Mehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). It is important
to note the difference between the induction.process under the act of 1940 and the
act of 1917. Under the present act the draftee is inducted at the hands of the army
after he presents himself at the induction center. Under the 1917 act, induction
was completed at the hands of the local board before the draftee reported for
active duty. After induction the inductee was mailed his notice ordering him to
report on a certain date and informing him that -he would be subject to militaryjurisdiction as of that date. However, his induction could not be complete without
notice of physical qualification.
Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865, L. R. A. 1918E 1015 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
'Second Article of War, 41 STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. §1473 (1927).
'United States v. McIntyre, 4 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).10Ex parte Goldstein, 268 Fed. 431 (D. C. Mass. 1920).
United States v. McIntyre, 4 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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Neither the Selective Training and Service Act of 194012 nor the
Service Extension Act of 194113 sets out the procedure for induction.
Authority to prescribe the rules and regulations necessary to carry out
the provisions of the act is delegated to the President. The regulations
now in effect and in effect at the time the petitioner presented himself
at the induction center merely provide, "At the induction center, the
selected men found acceptable will be inducted into the land or naval
forces."'14 There is no requirement for the giving of an oath.
There was, however, an earlier regulation, 15 to which the above is an
amendment, that did provide that "An officer... will administer a pre-
scribed oath to each of the men. He will then inform them that they
are members of the land and [or] naval forces.... ." This regulation was
promulgated October 22, 1940. The amendment above was made De-
cember 31, 1941. Between these dates and under the authority of the
first order, it was held that induction did include swearing allegiance,' 8
but the petitioner's cause was heard more than nine months after the
amendment was made.
This amendment, eliminating the requirement of an oath, said the
court in the principal case, "undoubtedly was... to avoid question being
raised and to avoid waste of army time and effort in resisting such
improvident proceedings as the one here. 1"l* However, there is a
dictum to the effect that the court would be of the same opinion even if
the earlier regulation were still in effect. The giving of an oath, it was
said, is a mere formality. It is only required by statute to be given to
voluntary enlistees.' 8
After the induction process was completed in the last war, the in-
ductee became subject to the- jurisdiction of the court martial even
though his application for exemption had been improperly denied and
his induction was therefore unlawful.19 The present act provides that:
"No person shall be tried by any... court martial... unless such person
has been actually inducted .... 20 Here lawful induction is no more a
prerequisite to military jurisdiction than under the earlier act. Thus,
there is no reason to suspect that the holding on this point will now be
any different. Though he is not subject to military law till inducted, the
registrant, and also non-registrant, is considered to have complete
2 54 STAT. 885 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, §301 et seq. (Supp. 1942).
" Id. §351 et seq.
,SELEcTivE SERvICE REGULATIONS (2d Ed. 1941) 1633.9.
"4 SEL EcTI SERVICE REGULATiONS §429 (1940).
"Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. Ore. 1940).
S7, The writer does not necessarily agree with the court's criticism of the peti-
tioner and feels that such criticism could well be omitted from the opinion.
"Article of War 109, 41 STAT. 809 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. §1581 (1927).
"Ex parte Tinkoff, 254 Fed. 912 (D. C. Mass. 1919).
.20 Selective Training and Service Act §11 (1940), 54 STAT. 849 (1940), 50
U. S. C. A. Appendix, §311 (Supp. 1942).
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knowledge of the act and of the regulations made pursuant to it,21 and
the mailing to the registrant of any communication concerned with the
act constitutes notice of the contents whether or not it is ever actually
received. 22 Ignorance of the law, no matter for what reason, is no
excuse. 28
After the draft board mails the registrant his notice of classification,
he has five days to request an opportunity to appear before the board in
person.2 4 If he does not speak English, he may appear with an interpre-
ter, but he cannot be represented by an attorney.25 The purpose of this
is probably to avoid prejudice to those unable to pay attorney's fees.
From the decision of the local board, the registrant may appeal to the
State Board of Appeal.26 At that hearing the registrant has no right to
appear. The decision is based wholly on the record sent up from the
local board. Finally, the appeal may lie to- the President in certain
specified cases.27
On receipt of new evidence the local board may reclassify the regis-
trant at any time before induction,28 and the same appellate procedure
lies from a reclassification as lies from the original classification. 29
In order to minimize any hardships and injustices caused by this pro-
cedure, Government Appeal Agents3 o and Advisory Boards have been
established.3 1 There is an Appeal Agent for each local board. His duties
are twofold: (1) to give registrants legal advice concerning appeal and
(2) to protect the interests of the government by appealing any classifi-
cation he thinks should be appealed. Advisory Boards, appointed by the
governor of each state, have the sole function of aiding the registrant in
preparing his questionnaires, claims, etc. However, the functions of
these agencies are unfortunately inadequate because of the general lack
of knowledge of their existence.
Even though this procedure permits a fair hearing and the decision
of the local board is expressly made final except where appeal is author-
ized by the regulations,3 2 the courts will grant review after exhaustion
of the remedies provided in the act38 in those cases where the board
211 SE&ECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS §155 (1940).221d. §158.
2' Lekto v. Scott, 251 Fed. 767 (E. D. N. Y. 1918) (petitioner had inadequate
knowledge of English).
' 3 SELECTIVE SERVICE REGuLATIONS §368 (1940).
" Id. §368.
2" Id. §§370-378. 27 Id. §§379-381.
28 Id. §387. "Id. §388.Io 1 S E ,EcV SERvIcE REGULATIONS §135 (1940).11d. §145.
"Selective Training and Service Act §10 (1940), 54 STAT. 893 (1940), 50 U. S.
C. A. Appendix, §310F (Supp. 1942).
"Johnson v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942); United
States v. Kowal, 45 F. Supp. 301 (D. C. Del. 1942). Same applied under 1917 act.
Napore v. Rowe, 256 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919). It was further held under
that act that after exhaustion of the remedies, resort to the courts must be prompt.
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acted arbitrarily, 4 where it had no jurisdiction8 5 or where there was no
evidence to support the finding of the board. e* Also, where a defendant
is charged with violation of the Selective Service Act by failing to com-
ply with the orders of the local board, he may defend on the same
grounds.3 7 However, in the last war, it was difficult-to prove any of
the prerequisites to judicial protection,38 and there is no reasoti to believe
that it will be easier now. 9
Review by certiorari is not permitted because the functions of the
draft boards are legislative and administrative and not judicial.40 In-
junction will not lie4 ' because the petitioner is claiming a violation of
merely personal rights and because equity will not interfere to control the
action of public officials constituting inferior quasi judicial tribunals on
matters within their jurisdiction. Therefore, it appears that the only
course open to the aggrieved registrant is to wait until he is inducted
and then sue out a writ of habeas corpus and attempt to convince the
court that the board denied him a fair hearing.
The constitutionality of legislation calling for compulsory military
service in time of war has many times been questioned and always sus-
tained,42 but the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 is the first
peace time compulsory service bill in the history of our nation. This fact
has furnished new fuel for attacks on the ground of unconstitutionality.
It is not doubted that Congress has the power to raise and support armies
Two months was too long to delay. Ex parte Blazekovic, 248 Fed. 327 (E. D.
Mich. 1918).
" United States v. Grieme, 128 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942); ex parte
Hurtflis, 245 Fed. 413 (E. D. N. Y. 1918).
" United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ill. 1942) ; United States
ex rel. Bartalini v. Mitchell, 248 Fed. 997 (E. D. N. Y. 1918).
"* Application of Greenberg, 39 F. Supp. 13 (D. C. N. J. 1941) ; ex parte Platt,
253 Fed. 798 (W. D. N. Y. 1917). If there is any evidence at all to support the
board, the court is without jurisdiction to review. United States v. Buttecali, 46 F.
Supp. 39 (S. D. Tex. 1942).
It has been said that the court has no jurisdiction at all to review the action of
the local board because it is purely administrative and not quasi judicial. Petition
of Soberman, 37 F. Supp. 522 (E. D. N. Y. 1941). However, that case appears
to have been based erroneously on an earlier decision that a writ of certiorari
would not issue to review the classification of the board. United States ex rel.
Roman v. Rauch, 253 Fed. 814, 816- (S. D. N. Y. 1918). The better view seems to
be that the court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the draft board,
but it may determine whether a fair hearing has been afforded. Micheli v. Paulin,
45 F. Supp. 687 (D. C. N. 3. 1942).
'T United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 CE. D. Ill. 1942).
"Ex Parte Kusweski, 251 Fed. 997 (N. D. N. Y. 1918).
"Filmio v. Powell, 38 F. Supp. 183 (D. N.'J. 1941).
'" Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board No. 1, 130 F. (2d) 610 (C. C. A. 3d,
1942). It was suggested under the 1917 act that certiorari would be appropriate.
Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54, 68 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). However, the courts
refused to permit it. Re Kitzerow, 252 Fed. 865 (E. D. Wis. 1918).
. Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54, 64-66 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Totus v. United
States, 39 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Wash. 1941).
"' Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. ed. 349, L. R. A.
1918C 361, ANt. CAs. 1918B 856 (1917).
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in peace time,43 but it has been argued that the power to compel service
can only follow a declaration of war. Fortunately, this argument has
not been successful. 44 The power given to Congress is plenary. There
is no such limitation placed upon it. To so limit would preclude our
preparing for battle, though we knew battle was to come, until it was
too late. This thought is not new to our times. Alexander Hamilton
writing in The Federalist4 5 remarked that "the ceremony of a formal
declaration of war has of late fallen into disuse." He then pointed out
the mistake of waiting for an attack before issuing the legal warrant for
protective measures.
It is only by the grace of the legislature that certain classes of citizens
including conscientious objectors are exempt from service. Under the
present act objectors receive more liberal treatment than under the 1917
Act in that they are not required to be members of a religious sect.
However, their objections must be based on their "religious training and
belief."' 46 Thus, it still appears that no one without a religious belief
may be exempt even though he may have the strongest moral convictions
against combat. But, if one is entitled to an exemption, he does not have
to prove it affirmatively before his local board as he did under the 1917
Act. 47 In fact, the present administrative tendency is to permit few
exemptions to be waived, and those may only be waived in writing.48
The requirement of military service, the "supreme and noble duty of
citizenship, ' ' 49 could, should Congress so desire, be exacted of every
citizen without exception. In upholding the constitutionality of the Con-
federate Conscription Law, the Virginia court said: "The citizens have
a right collectively and individually to the services of each other to avert
any danger which may be menaced. The manner in which the service is
to be apportioned among them and rendered by them, is a matter for
the legislature. The government, as the agent and trustee of the people,
is charged with the whole military strength of the nation, in order that
it may be employed so as to ensure the safety of all."5 0
EDwiN N. MANER, JR.
"U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, 12.
"United States v. Lambert, 123 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); United
States v. Herling, 120 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).dr No XXV (1787).
" Selective Service and Training Act §4(g) (1940), 54 STAT. 885 (1940), 50
U. S. C. A. Appendix, §301 et seq. (Supp. 1942).
Napore v. Rowe, 256 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
"Geraghty, Judicial Protection of Individuals Under the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940 (1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 310, 314, n. 34.
" Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. ed. 349, L. R. A.
1918C 361, ANN. CAs. 1918B 856 (1917).
" Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Gratt. 470, 487 (Va. 1864).
Another of our Southern courts waked poetic in holding that a soldier forced
to serve was not a slave. It said, "Nations do not pension slaves to commemorate
their valor. They do not 'give in charge their names to a sweet lyre'; nor does
'sculpture in her turn give bond in stone and ever during brass to guard and im-
mortalize the trust.'" Story v. Perkins, 243 Fed. 997, 998-999 (S. D. Ga. 1917).
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Divorce-Enforcement of Consent Judgment for Payment in Lieu
of Alimony by Contempt Proceeding-Imprisonment four Debt
H instituted action against W for divorce from bed and board. No
pleadings were filed, but a consent judgment was entered which provided
inter alia that H and W should live separate and apart and that H should
pay to W, "in lieu of alimony, or other marital rights or obligations,"
regular monthly installments of money until a named total had been paid.
The judgment further provided that H should pay additional monthly
installments in stated amounts to a third person as trustee, the purpose
of these payments being to liquidate the principal of an obligation due
by H and W and secured by a deed of trust upon the home of W. The
preamble to the judgment recited that W had advanced certain moneys
to H which he used in his business and recognized his obligation to
repay. The following provision was inserted in the order: "The money
payments provided herein shall be more than a simple judgment for debt.
They shall be as effectively binding upon the plaintiff [H] as if rendered
under and by virtue of the authority of Section 1667, Consolidated
Statutes of North Carolina, and the failure of the plaintiff [H] to make
the payments ... shall ... subject him to such-penalties as may be re-
quired by the court, in case of contempt of its orders." H, after having
made some of the payments, refused to comply further with the terms of
the judgment, and was committed to jail for contempt. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, two judges dissenting, upheld the commitment
on appeal.'
This note will deal with the propriety of enforcing the judgment in
the instant case by contempt proceedings. 2*
1 Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 22 S. E. (2d) 576 (1942).
2* Three other problems were dealt with in the case:
(1) It appeared that the judgment was signed by the resident judge out of the
county and out of the district in which the case was pending at a time when, by
the law of rotation, he was holding the courts of another district. The court de-
cided that under the authority of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§1436, 1438,
598 the judge could properly sign the order under such circumstances.
(2) Since the judgment was entered by consent with no pleadings ever having
been filed, there was never any allegation that H was at fault. In the absence of
such an allegation, H questioned the validity of the order for him to pay money.
The court held that since the order was entered by consent, a judgment might be
entered as to any matter of which the court had general jurisdiction, without
regard to pleadings, citing Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8 S. E. (2d) 209 (1940);
Holloway v. City of Durham, 176 N. C. 550, 97 S. E. 486 (1918).
(3) The citation for contempt was heard by a special judge. The record seemed
to indicate that the hearing might have been held after the term of court for which
the special judge had been commissioned had expired. In the absence of exception
or assignment of error based upon contrary showing, the majority of the court
did not go into the matter. Devin, J., however, wrote a dissenting opinion saying
that the court should, ex inero motu, make investigations to determine whether or
not the special judge had authority to hear the citation at the time. Seawell, J.,
concurred in this dissent. Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 188, 22 S. E.
(2d) 576, 581 (1942).
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It is unquestioned that a judgment for alimony may be enforced in
North Carolina by contempt,8 and this is true although the judgment is
entered by consent.4 All jurisdictions in the United States, except Mis-
souri, 5 hold that imprisonment for willful refusal to pay alimony does
not violate the constitutional provisions forbidding imprisonment for
debt.6 The problem presented in the principal case is to determine
whether the judgment was in reality a judgment for alimony or whether
it was merely an order to pay a debt. If it was the latter, H could not
be constitutionally imprisoned for failure to make the payments.7
Justice Seawell, in his dissenting opinion,8 argued that the judgment
was for the payment of a debt rather than for'alimony. This appears to
the writer to be the most logical interpretation of the facts and the judg-
ment. The majority opinion proceeds upon the assumption that the
agreement was made and the judgment entered solely in contemplation
of providing subsistence for W. This, argues the majority, makes the
judgment one, in effect, for alimony; and, since the parties plainly con-
sented that the judgment should have the same force and effect as if it
had been rendered under the authority of the statute providing for ali-
mony without divorce,9* subjects H to citation for contempt upon will-
ful failure to pay. To bring the payments to be made to the trustee in
order to release the encumbrance on W's house within their line of rea-
soning, the court said that a house in which to live reasonably came
within the meaning of subsistence.
If it had been true that the parties entered into the consent judgment
for the sole purpose of securing means of subsistence to the wife, one
could hardly take issue with the conclusiQn. But the judgment plainly
recited that the payments were to be made "in liei of alimony, or other
narital rights or obligations."'0 This expressly excludes alimony; it
emphasizes the idea that H is agreeing to make the payments, not be-
cause he recognizes that the marriage relation has imposed upon him a
duty to do so, but for some other reason. He probably would not have
consented to a decree for alimony as such, for, being the plaintiff in the
'Little v. Little, 203 N. C. 694, 166 S. E. 809 (1932) ; Pain v. Pain, 80 N. C. 322(1879).
'Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N. C. 620, 194 S. E. 278 (1937).
Harrington v. Harrington, 233 Mo. App. 390, 121 S. W. (2d) 291 (1938);
Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866).
'2 ScEOULER, MARRIAGE, DIvoRCE, SEPARATION AND DoMEsTIc RELATIONS (6th
ed. 1921) §1835.
" N. C. CoNsT. Art. I, §16.8 Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22 S. E. (2d) 576, 384 (1942).
* N. C. ConE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1667, providing that if any husband shall
separate himself from his wife and fail to provide her and the children of the
marriage with necessary subsistence according to his means and condition in life,
or if he shall be a drunkard or a spendthrift, or be guilty of any misconduct or
acts that would constitute cause for divorce, either absolute or from bdd and board,
the wife may institute an action for alimony without divorce.
'0 Italics supplied.
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action for divorce from bed and board, he probably did not consider
himself the party at fault.
Why, then, did H agree to make the payments? Evidently they were
intended at least partly to satisfy the debt, referred to in the preamble
to the judgment, which H owed to W. If H and W did not intend that
this judgment should discharge the indebtedness, the obligation remains
unsatisfied, and W can maintain a contract action against H. Unless
they intended that the debt should be discharged by the agreement on the
part of H to make the payments stipulated in the judgment, there was no
reason at all for referring to this debt in the preamble. The court failed
to mention the reference to the debt at all, and has held, by implication
from -its holding that no debt withiii the constitutional prohibition was
satisfied by the judgment, that the debt is still owed by H to W. This
was plainly not in accord with the intent of the parties. A well-reasoned
Michigan case held that an award of money which was partly for alimony
and partly for other purposes could not be enforced by contempt where
the amount to be paid as alimony was not plainly separated from the
other money payments provided in the award. 1 Thus, since at least
part of the payments agreed to by H were intended to discharge the debt,
the judgment should not have been enforced by contempt.
Justice Seawell called attention to another defect in the court's
analysis of the problem. 12 The statute under which the parties agreed
that H might be punished for contempt has been held to apply only to
independent suits for alimony.' 8 The instant proceeding was begun as
an action for divorce from bed and board. Therefore, if the judgment
were in reality one for alimony, it could not have been awarded under
that statute in such a proceeding. Nor could alimony be awarded under
the statute allowing alimony to the wife upon a decree of divorce from
bed and board, 14 since there was no divorce to which such alimony is
incident.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that a court could not enforce
by contempt a judgment ordering a husband to make payments to a
third person in order to pay off a mortgage on the house in which the
wife was to liVe, since alimony consists of payments to be made to the
wife and not to a third person.'6 These payments were of the same
nature as those to be made by H in the principal case. Since the obliga-
tion secured by the deed of trust upon W's home was due by both H and
11Sturgis v. Sturgis, 300 Mich. 438, 2 N. W. (2d) 454 (1942).
1Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22 S. E. (2d) 576, 584 (1942).
"Shore v. Shore, 220 N. C. 802, 18 S. E. (2d) 353 (1942) ; Silver v. Silver,
220 N. C. 191, 16 S. E. (2d) 834 (1941) ; Dawvson v. Dawson, 211 N. C. 453, 190
S. E. 749 (1937).
"N. C. CoDE AxN. (Michie, 1939) §1665.Collins v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 48 Ariz. 381, 62 P.
(2d) 131 (1936).
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W, it would seem that the provision for these payments was inserted in
the judgment at least partly with the idea of having H pay off the part
of the debt due by W. When considered in this light, it becomes plain
that this provision was also one for the payment of debt, although it
may, as the court suggested, have also contemplated providing the wife
with a house in which to live.
It is submitted that the court erred in upholding the citation for con-
tempt. Although H consented that failure to pay might subject him to
contempt proceedings under the statute relating to alimony without
divorce, his consent could not give a court jurisdiction to imprison him
for debt. He might just as well, as Justice Seawell suggests, "have
agreed that a default in the payment of the debt should subject him to
punishment under any criminal statute which may be found in the
books."16  JOEL DENTON.
Liability of Sureties-Extent to Which Liability Established Against
Principal Determines the Liability of Surety
Action by creditor against both principal and surety. The principal
had made a statement admitting liability but such statement was made
after default and without the principal knowing of his rights. Held:
The surety has the right to stand on his contract and the statement of
the principal is not binding on the surety.1
Assuming that the surety has no defenses of his own the extent to
which he may use defenses of the debtor is extremely limited. Ordinarily
any defense, not personal to the debtor, is available to the surety in an
action on the surety bond2 but some cases seem to hold that a surety
cannot make use of a defense (of the debtor) which the principal waives
or otherwise precludes himself from making 5 While this doctrine does
not apply to cases involving fraud or collusion between debtor and
creditor, 4 it does seem to extend the liability of the surety, for if a
'o Seawell, J., dissenting in Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 192, 22
S. E. (2d) 576, 584 (1942), cited supra note 1.
Chozen Confections, Inc. v. Johnson, 221 N. C. 224, 19 S. E. (2d) 866 (1942).
'The Peoples Bank v. Loven, 17,2 N. C. 666, 90 S. E. 948 (1916) ; United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Town of Dothan, 174 Ala. 480, 56 So. 953 (1911);
Bear v. Duval Lumber Co., 112 Fla. 240, 150 So. 614 (1933); Greenwood v.
Greenwood, 44 Ga. App. 848, 163 S. E. 318 (1932); Benson v. Alleman, 220 Iowa
731, 263 N. W. 305 (1935); Iowa Bonding & Casualty Co. v. Wagner Co., 203
Iowa 179, 210 N. W. 775 (1926); City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio v.
Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 117 N. W. 758 (1908) ; State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312,
135 S. E. 270 (1926).
'Burwell v. First National Bank, 86 Ind. App. 581, 159 N. E. 15 (1928);
Union State Bank v. A7herican Surety Co., 324 Mo. 438, 23 S. W. (2d) 1038
(1930); M. S. Cohn Gravel Co. v. Southern Surety Co., 129 Okla. 171, 264 Pac.
206 (1928) ; Rathgaber v. Horton, 52 S. D. 436, 218 N. W. 148 (1928).
'City National Bank of Columbus, Ohio v. Jordan, 139 Iowa 499, 117 N. W.
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debtor has a defense and takes advantage of it then in many instances the
surety will be discharged. Whether or not a waiver of defense is to be
binding on the surety should depend on the nature of the defense. There
are defenses which go to the validity of the principal contract, e.g., no
consideration, illegality. If there is a failure of consideration the surety
may talke advantage of this fact as a defense5 even though the principal
has not set it up first. To permit a waiver of this defense by the prin-
cipal to bind the surety will in effect change the surety's contract upon
which he has a right to stand. It will deprive the principal of the use
of the property from which it was contemplated that the principal would
secure funds with which to pay his debt. The surety's liability would be
for a contract which either never existed in the case of total failure of
consideration or only partially existed in the case of partial failure of
consideration. Where the defense is illegality the courts will refuse to
grant a plaintiff their aid.6 And to permit a waiver of such defense
would in effect allow a plaintiff to recover upon a contract in violation
of law. Some defenses arise, not from the nature of the bargain, but
from the nature of the parties, e.g., infancy. This defense, if the debtor
is the infant, is not available to the surety even after the principal sets
it up,7 and rightly so, for this may be the very reason the creditor se-
cured a surety before parting with his goods. However, there is an
exception to this rule where the infant both renounces the contract and
returns the consideration so that the creditor is placed in status quo ;8
but proof on this issue is on the surety and is in the end a failure of
consideration. Then there are cases which present defenses arising be-
cause of wrongs perpetrated on one of the parties, e.g., fraud or duress.
It is not within the scope of this note to deal with defenses which accrue
to the surety in his own right such as where the fraud is on him. Where
there is fraud on the principal the surety may not avail himself of the
defense unless the principal first sets it up.9 If, then, this defense is
waived by the principal it will not be available to the surety. The reason-
ing of the court is that the defense of fraud ispersonal to the principal
and he may waive the fraud and insist on enforcement of the contract
and the surety may not make this election to set up the defense for the
principal. But this reasoning seems to be fallacious for the surety has
758 (1908) ; Taylor-Fichter Steel Const. Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y.,
258 App. Div. 235, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 218 (1940).
Forsythe v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 130 Misc. Rep. 569, 224
N. Y. Supp. 330 (1927).
a Walker v. Graham, 228 Ala. 574, 154 So. 806 (1934); Schur v. Johnson, 2
Cal. App. (2d) 680, 38 P. (2d) 844 (1935).
McKee v. Harwood Automobile Co., 204 Ind. 233, 183 N. E. 646 (1933).
' Lagerquist v. Bankers' Bond & Mortgage Guaranty Co., 201 Iowa 430, 205
N. W. 977, 43 A. L. R. 585 (1933).
*Burwell v. First Nat. Bank, 86 Ind. App. 581, 159 N. E. 15 (1928) ; Rathga-
her v. Horton, 52 S. D. 436, 218 N. W. 148 (1928).
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the right to stand on his contract.' 0 This would include the right to have
the contract on which he became surety as it was when he became surety
which would include the defense of fraud available to the principal. The
defense of duress should likewise be treated. Any other view allows
the creditor to profit -by his own wrong. And even if the principal is
willing to waive defenses of fraud or duress as to himself and insist on
enforcement of the contract the creditor should not be allowed to retain
the additional security of the surety.
Assuming again that the surety has no defenses of his own, and
assuming further (1) that there are admissions by the principal of his
liability under a contract, (2) that the creditor has secured a judgment
against the debtor, then to what extent are these binding on the surety?
First, as to admissions of liability by the principal. The availability
of an admission of the principal against the surety should be determined
by the nature of the admission. If the admission is urged merely as a
waiver of defense, then the above discussion of waiver should be applied.
But, if the admission be urged as proof that there never was any defense
or that it does not now exist, a different doctrine should be applicable.
While the surety may not object tQ the principal remaining bound,11 he
has a right to stand on his own contract.' 2 In other words a surety is
not bound by what a principal says he has or has not done but on the
contrary he. is bound by what the principal actually does.' 3 The outcome
of a case involving liability of surety, then will be determined by proof
or disproof of the alleged liability of the principal. In this connection
the competency of evidence will go a long way toward controlling the
outcome of the case, and it is at once apparent how much influence an
admission of liability by the principal will have if such admissions are
competent. It is common to find a court saying that admissions of in-
debtedness by a debtor are admissible against his surety,1 4 and there are
cases which contain general statements that admissions of the principal
are not admissible against the surety.15 But from an examination of the
'0 Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938); Cohen v. Hurwitz,
142 N. Y. Supp. 305 (1913); State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312, 135 S. E. 270(1926).
"'United States v. Shea-Adamson Co., 21 F. Supp. 831 (D. Minn. 1937) ; Van
Kirk v. Adler, 111 Ala. 113, 20 So. 336 (1896) ; M. S. Cohn Gravel Co. v. Southern
Surety Co., 129 Okla. 171, 264 Pac. 206 (1928).
" Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938) ; Cohen v. Hurwitz, 142
N. Y. Supp. 305 (1913) ; State v. Duggan, 102 W. Va. 312, 135 S. E. 270 (1926).
"- Chelmsford Co. v. Demerest, 7 Gray (Mass.) 1 (1856); Kellum v. Clark,
97 N. Y. 390 (1884); Hatch v. Elkins, 65 N. Y. 489 (1875).
"' Graves v. Aetna Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., 215 Ala. 250, 110 So. 390
(1927) ; Smith v. Republic Underwriters, 152 Kan. 305, 103 P. (2d) 858 (1940) ;
Atlas Shoe Co. v. Bloom, 209 Mass. 563, 95 N. E. 952 (1911) ; Cook County Liquor
Co. v. Brown, 31 Okla. 614, 122 Pac. 167 (1912) ; W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Graham,
4 Wash. (2d) 407, 103 P. (2d) 1076 (1940).1 United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 56 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.
2d,1932) ; Chicago Portrait Co. v. O'Nean, 6 Ga. App. 425, 65 S. E. 161 (1909) ;
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cases admissibility seems to be determined with reference to the time the
statement was made, i.e., if the statement was made after a breach or
default by the debtor such admissions are not competent evidence,' 6
while if the statement was made during the life of the contract it is
admissible.17 The admissions after default are, in a sense, treated as
hearsay,' 8 and the admissions made during the formation of the contract
as part of the res gestae. 19 The distinction between admissions after
default and those made during the formation of the contract is under-
standable under the res gestae doctrine, But the reason for admitting
statements made between the time of completion of the transaction and
the time of default is less clear, for there appears no reason to make
such statements binding on the surety since the principal is not-the agent
of the surety. And also there should be,.a rule that the principal may not
act to the prejudice of his surety. Courts seem to follow the reasoning
that a principal is less likely to make a statement admitting liability be-
fore default than after. But it would seem to be the reverse, for why
would a person admit that he is liable as of the time of such statement
more quickly than he would admit liability that is to become absolute in
the future? A creditor should have to prove that a debt is owing from
the principal by original evidence excluding statements of the principal
made after the transacting of the business.2 0
Great Western Life Assurance Co. v. Shumway, 25 N. D. 268, 141 N. W. 479(1913) ; Armstrong v. Goldberg, 190 Wash. 210, 67 P. (2d) 328 (1937).
"o Graves v. Aetna Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn., 215 Ala. 250, 110 So. 396
(1927) (Admissions of indebtedness by principal after being declared in default
held not binding on surety); Atlanta Journal Co. v. Knowles, 24 Ga. App. 745,
102 S. E. 191, (1920) (An admission of a principal that an account was correct,
due, and unpaid -held not admissible in a suit against the surety, where made after
the principal had been dismissed as the plaintiff's agent ; Citizen's National Bank-
of Leighton v. Kupres, 106 Pa. Super. 164, 161 Atl. 466 (1932) (In action on note
wherein defendant obtained rule to open judgment by confession, defendant's
declarations, in' absence of guarantor on day after alleged fraud, held properly
excluded).
"' United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 56 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932) (Admissions made by principal in'transacting business for which surety
is bound are competent evidence against surety) ; Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275
Ill. 462, 114 N. E. 181 (1916) (Admissions made in regular course of the guar-
anteed business" by the president and general manager of a corporation as to the
amount of its indebtedness to a guarantee held competent against guarantors in
suit on guaranty, although made shortly before bankruptcy).
" Padavic v. Vanderboom, 207 Ill. App. 600 (1917) (A statement made by the
maker of a note to a collector for the payee, out of the presence of the surety, at
the time of presentation of the note for payment, that he would fix the matter with
the payee, is purely hearsay as to the surety). However, notice that Illinois holds
admissions by the principal made in regular course of business to be admissible.
Schovill Mfg. Co. v. Cassidy, 275 Ill. 462, 114 N. E. 181 (1916), cited supra
note 17.
" Dietrich v. Dr. Koch Vegetable Tea Co., 56 Okla. 636, 156 Pac. 188 (1916)
(Declarations and conduct of the principal become a part of the res gestae ind
admissible against surety, where they were made during the transaction-of the
business for which the surety is bound, but not otherwise).10 See Hatch v. Elkins, 65 N. Y. 489, 496 (1875).
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Second, as to the effect of a judgment against the principal in an
action against the surety. Here too, there is an apparent division of
authority. Some courts seem to hold that judgment against the prin-
cipal is not binding on the surety2 ' while other cases hold it to be only
prima facie evidence of a breach by the principal, 22 and still others hold
that the judgment is conclusive as to the liability of the surety.23 An
analysis of these cases will reveal that judgment is binding on the surety
if he is surety on a bond such as a replevin bond, while if the suretyship
contract is for the faithful performance of a contract, i.e., business deal,
then judgment against the principal is only prima facie evidence of a
breach of the principal contract. This distinction is justified, for where
a person is surety on a replevin bond usually breach of the bond depends
simply on the existence of a judgment against the principal. Judgments
rendered on business deals are determined only on evidence produced in
court by the parties. Those cases which hold that a judgment against the
principal is not binding on the surety deal with exceptions to the two
rules above, such as where the defense is payment,24 where the surety is
entitled to defend in his own right,2 5 or where the surety obligation is
for less than the judgment.2 6
While set-offs and counterclaims are not defenses it may be well to
point out here that a surety, when used alone, may not avail himself of
a set-off or counterclaim that a principal might use.2 7 This doctrine
seems to be based upon the fact that a counterclaim is an independent
right of action belonging to the principal which he may or may not wish
to invoke. The doctrine, however, has been extended to prohibit the
surety from counterclaiming for usurious payments by the debtor2 s but
North Carolina allows a surety to set-off such usurious payments.29 It
was also extended, in what appears to be a very poor decision, to a case
where the defendant was surety for the return of the purchase price and
the buyer had not exercised reasonable care in handling the purchased
" Speight Box & Panel Co. v. Ipock, 217 N. C. 375, 8 S. E. (2d) 243 (1940) ;
J. E. McCoy & Son v. Atkins, 172 Ark. 365, 288 S. W. 886 (1927); Randall v.
Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938).
2 Moses v. United States, 166 U. S. 571, 600, 17 S. Ct. 682, 693, 41 L. ed. 1119,
1129 (1896) ; Sauer v. Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co., 237 Mich. 697, 213 N. W.
98 (1927); see United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 56 F. (2d)
734, 735 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
2" Brewer v. Kirk, 256 Ky. 822, 77 S. W. (2d) 34 (1935) ; Giatas v. Demoulas,
271 Mass. 51, 170 N. E. 921 (1930).
24 Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938) ; see Merrill v. Equitable
Surety Co. of N. Y., 131 Misc. 541., 227 N. Y. Supp. 266, 273 (1928).
" Speight Box & Panel Co. v. Ipock, 217 N. C. 375, 8 S. E. (2d) 243 (1940).
2 "Moses v. United States, 166 U. S. 571, 600, 17 S. Ct. 682, 693, 41 L. ed. 1119,
1129 (1896) ; J. E. McCoy & Sons v. Atkins, 172 Ark. 365, 288 S. W. 886 (1927).27National Surety Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 60 F. (2d) 847 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1932).
" Savage v. Fox, 60 N. H. 17 (1880). Contra: Cole v. Hills, 44 N. H. 227
(1862).
" Peoples Bank v. Loven, 172 N. C. 666, 90 S. E. 948 (1916).
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goods,3 0 the court holding that the surety could not set off the amount
of damage to the goods caused by such negligent handling.
In Chozen Confections, Inc. v. Johnson3 l where the admission was
made by the principal after default and also without the principal having
knowledge of his rights, it is submitted that the North Carolina Supreme
Court has reached the only proper and just conclusion.
ROBERT R. BoND.
Graham v. Middleby, 213 Mass. 437, 100 N. E. 750, 43 L. R. A. (N.s.) 977(1913).1221 N. C. 224, 19 S. E. (2d) 866 (1942).
